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THERE is clear evidence that longevity is one of the major causes of the
increasing incidence of divorce.' Concurrently there has been a sharp drop in
the mortality rate in childhood and adolescence. As a consequence of these
simultaneous changes, increasing numbers of minor children have divorced
parents and for more years. The law must deal with these increasing numbers
flexibly. It may be necessary, therefore, to develop new legal instruments for
the protection of the interests of the children of divorced parents.
In Ford v. Ford,2 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1962, Mr. Justice
Black wrote, "Unfortunately, experience has shown that the question of cus-
tody, so vital to a child's happiness and well-being, frequently cannot be left
to the discretion of the parents. This is particularly true where, as here, the
estrangement of husband and wife beclouds parental judgment with emotion
and prejudice.
'" 3
When a marriage fails, the usual procedure for providing for the welfare of
children, whether created by private agreement or by a battle in court, is either
to award exclusive custody to one parent, or to divide custody between parents
at some specified intervals in time, such as vacations, holidays, etc., or to en-
trust custody to a court-appointed guardian. Usually, however, a court-ap-
pointed guardian is viewed as a last resort, because it does not meet the child's
need for parents; the other usual dispositions are rigid, and can be altered
only by the complicated process of adjudication.
Since the needs of children change during the years before they reach
maturity, whatever provisions the law makes for them should be flexible. Yet
the many combinations of provisions which are ordinarily incorporated in
separation agreements and divorce papers have three inflexible attributes in
common: (a) an effort to achieve a compromise between the demands and
feelings of contending parents; (b) an absence of any machinery first for dis-
covering and then for serving the changing needs of the child; and (c) a
built-in tendency to be less flexible than a child's welfare requires.
No one can foresee the future. Therefore the usual provisions can have at
best an accidental relationship to the emotional needs of children as these
change over the years. There may be times when a child needs the constant
attention and affection of his mother, others when his father's masculine image
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is of primary importance. Furthermore not only the child but the parents and
their relationships may change. One or the other may marry or become ill.
Such changes create new emotional needs in the child. Although courts can
and do change custody provisions in efforts to meet changing needs, parents
are reluctant to invoke the machinery of the law for this purpose unless there
are overwhelming reasons for doing so, because the judicial machinery is slow
and expensive and may involve a degree of publicity which in itself is damag-
ing to the children and undesirable for the parents.
In order to provide a satisfactory compromise between the parents and to
gain that flexibility which is necessary for the child, it is necessary to develop
new legal instruments for the protection of the interests of the children of
divorced parents. Such a new approach is surely conceivable; but since I am
not a lawyer, my only right to claim that the following suggestion is feasible
derives from the fact that it has already been incorporated into a large number
of separation and divorce agreements, which have been drawn up by eminent
law firms in several states. The essence of the proposal consists of joint cus-
tody of the child, the appointment of a confidential adult-ally for the child and
a committee chosen by the parents to decide questions on which the parents
are unable to agree.
The specific steps are as follows. Upon separation or divorce the parents
agree that the child's interests are paramount, and that neither of them shall
have an exclusive right to custody. They accept the responsibility to attempt
to decide together by mutual agreement every question that has a bearing on
the welfare of their child or children, e.g., where the child shall live and with
whom and for how long, where the child shall go to school and the kind of
school, what kind of medical or psychological help the child may have if
needed, what kind of vacations to spend and where and with whom, etc.
If and whenever the parents cannot reach an agreement on any matter of
concern to the child, they agree to submit the issue to a committee which they
themselves choose at the time they make the agreement, and to accept uncon-
ditionally the committee's decisions, and to be guided by it. The committee
will act at the instance of either parent, and the failure of the other to present
his side when given the opportunity does not make the committee's decision
ineffective.
(There are arguments for the relative simplicity of choosing a single in-
dividual for this task rather than a committee; but in practice it has proved
almost impossible to persuade any one individual to carry so heavy a respon-
sibility alone, and relatively easy to persuade even the same individual to
serve on a committee. Furthermore, the committee offers a degree of con-
tinuity, stability and weight of authority which no one individual can supply.)
The parents select the members of this committee by mutual agreement,
and directly or through their respective counsel secure the necessary consents
to serve. It is usual to ask a pediatrician, a child psychiatrist or child analyst,
an educator and/or an impartial lawyer or clergyman. The parents grant to
the members of the committee the right to replace any member who with-
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draws or becomes ill or dies; but in choosing such a replacement the com-
mittee must have its choice approved by the two principals, or where necessary
by their respective legal advisors.
The parents further agree that each child shall have one trusted adult-ally
outside the family circle with whom the child can talk in confidence. They
choose this person from a list of available certified specialists in child psy-
chology, child psychiatry or child analysis. The purpose of this is to make
sure that someone who has experience with the highly specialized skills of
interviewing and drawing out children will always be available to explore in
confidence the child's reactions to parents, homes, schools, camps, doctors and
all similar factors for the guidance of both the parents and the committee. It
is rarely easy for a child to talk to adults, and least of all to his own warring
parents. Under these circumstances, to talk to either will make a child feel
disloyal to the other. He will be able to talk to an adult-ally who is outside
of the family without this inhibiting restriction. As already indicated, such an
adult-ally should have had technical training and experience in the highly spe-
cialized art of listening to children. Given such training, he can then inform
the committee of what the child thinks and feels, thus providing a sound basis
for the committee's decisions.
Finally, the agreement stipulates that the committee will have no role in the
financial guardianship of the children, but will deal only with their spiritual,
educational and psychological welfare and general health. It is obvious that it
will have to confer at times with the financial guardians of the child concern-
ing the economic feasibility of its recommendations.
The advantage of this proposal is that primary emphasis is placed on dis-
covering and serving the child's changing needs. As those needs change, at
least one of the parents will presumably perceive the change, and either per-
suade the other or bring the problem before the committe which, aided by the
child's ally, will be able to evaluate the situation free from the parents' biases.
Adjustments can thus be made without publicity, controversy or great ex-
pense. The child will also have the psychological advantage of retaining active
contact with both parents. Unless one or the other parent has been flagrantly
brutal and destructively amoral in relation to the child (in which case the other
parent presumably would not enter into such an agreement in the first place),
it is always disturbing to children to be substantially removed from contact
with either parent; because this gives rise to a secret feeling that there are
first-class and second-class parents. The difficulties which this feeling produces
can be traced through later years and even into the ultimate marriages of
these children. Therefore, a framework within which both parents maintain
contact and can work in harmony is psychologically of value to the child. Con-
tinuing relationship with both parents has been available in limited measure
through the customary provisions for joint custody, 'but the lack of adequate
machinery for resolving disagreements has often rendered joint custody im-
practical and has led to the disruption of the relationship of the child to one
parent or the other. It is this mechanism which the committee provides.
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No individual and no committee can hope for the wisdom of Solomon. One
need not expect that no mistakes of judgment will occur. Yet it is likely that
the committee will arrive at wise conclusions more consistently than the par-
ent. No parent can evaluate his own children's needs apart from his own feel-
ings. No matter how sophisticated, mature and generous the parents may be,
each must in some measure have an axe to grind. A committee of friendly
outsiders provides not only special competence, but also an essential degree
of objectivity. The likelihood of sound decisions is still further increased by
the fact that they can benefit by the information and the counsel offered by
the'special adult-ally of the child, for which the agreement provides.
In practice, such committees have done more than solve disputes. Their
mere existence often protects the parents from reaching an impasse. As a
result, such committees have had to be called into action only rarely. I have
seen parents who had squabbled for years behave with restraint and generosity
under the civilizing influence of the externalized conscience which the commit-
tee comes to represent. Furthermore the parents will have chosen the commit-
tee from among people they both know and respect; and they will be ashamed
to appear before it to admit that they have failed to reach agreement. Nor will
a parent lightly reject the decision of a committee after the committee has
been called into action, both because of the high moral force which the com-
mittee represents, and because of the new problems which such a rejection
would initiate. I have only once seen a parent even attempt to reject a com-
mittee's decision.
At this point, lawyers usually ask whether a court, which has of course the
right to scrutinize committee decisions, would accept the committee device
and enforce its decisions. I cannot answer this question, because to the best
of my knowledge it has never been tested. However, since such a plan as this
is intrinsically fair to both parents, since it places consideration of the welfare
of the child above the pride of parents, since it has been entered into freely
by the parents, and "since the committee will have considerable competence, any
parent who rejects the decision of a committee would come into court with
a case which was strongly weighted against him. Certainly no better machinery
is available to any court for determining a child's best interests, than is avail-
able to the committee with the aid of the child's specially qualified ally.
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